Pion, G., Arnold, S., Schwartz, E., Johnson, J., Mandelbaum, E., & Rhodes, M. (2026). "Remembering Generalizations: Memory Mechanisms Underlying the Generic Recall Bias". In Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 48. (preprint)
Rhodes, M., Pion, G., Schwartz, E., & Mandelbaum, E. (forthcoming). "If Core Knowledge Is Perceptual, How Does it Contribute to Conceptual Development?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (preprint)
Commentary on Bai, D., Hafri, A., Izard, V., Firestone, C., & Strickland, B. (2025). “Core Perception”: Re-imagining Precocious Reasoning as Sophisticated Perceiving. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1–75. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X25102756.
Schwartz, E., Pion, G. (=co-first authors), Quilty-Dunn, J., Mandelbaum, E., & Caplan, S. (2025). "Polysemy and Inference: Reasoning with Underspecified Representations", in Azzurra Ruggeri, David Barner, Caren Walker & Neil Bramley (eds.), Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. (preprint)
Pion, G., Schwartz, E. (=co-first authors), & Mandelbaum, E. (forthcoming), "Believe What We Think!: The Spinozan Theory of Mind", in T. Lombrozo & N. Van Leeuwen (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. (preprint)
Paper on whether polysemy should be modeled as ambiguity (under review; draft available upon request)
Study on the representations used in reasoning (with Elliot Schwartz, Jake Quilty-Dunn, Eric Mandelbaum, and Spencer Caplan) (under review; preprint)
Study on whether generics uniquely lead to essentialism, and the underlying mechanisms for generic memory asymmetry effects (with Sophie Arnold, Elliot Schwartz, Julia Johnson, Eric Mandelbaum, Marjorie Rhodes) (in progress)
Paper on whether different individuals share the same concepts (in progress)
Paper on whether the language of thought is a natural kind (draft available upon request)